


The project would change the refinery's crude slate.

**Example of the project's significant oil quality impacts: hydrogen deficiency.**

	Density (°API)	Sulfur (wt. %)	Hydrogen (lbs/bbl)
<b>Current oils the project could replace</b>			
50% Basra / 50% Lula (B/L) blend	30.0	1.46	38.8
Alaska North Slope crude (ANS)	31.4	0.85	39.0
<b>Project-imported tar sands oil blends</b>			
45% CL / 55% HSB (CL/HSB) blend	27.2	1.87	37.8
30% SH / 70% SSB (SH/SSB) blend	28.3	1.71	37.1
<b>Crude feedstock change (hydrogen deficiency) from:</b>			
replacing B/L blend with CL/HSB blend (lbs H <sub>2</sub> /bbl)			-1.00
replacing ANS with SH/SSB blend (lbs H <sub>2</sub> /bbl)			-1.90
From publicly reported crude quality data; <i>see</i> CBE's 30 Mar 2016 Table KR-1.			

Project tar sands oil would cause significant refining impacts.



Excerpt from DEIR Figure 3-3. (200 feet grid-scale indicator repositioned for reference.) Project unloading facilities are shown by the horizontal green and black lines on this map.

Too close to existing equipment, the project would create a new knock-on (“chain reaction”) hazard that the EIR ignores.



US Chemical Safety Board investigation report finding: “The McKee Refinery’s Process Hazard Analysis was ineffective in identifying and addressing the hazards posed by fire exposure to neighboring equipment.”

Example: Valero McKee Refinery Fire, 16 Feb 2007.

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


Example: Carribean Petroleum Company Fire, 23 Oct 2009.

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Another example of knock-on (“chain reaction”) incidents:  
PDVSA Amuay Refinery Fire, 25 Aug 2012; 47 people killed.



Excerpt from RDEIR Figure 4.7-8. “Worst-Case Facility Thermal Radiation Hazards.” Project unloading facilities are represented by the diagonal pink line on this map.